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The	Beguiling:	glamour	in/as	platformed	cultural	production	
	
Abstract	
Arguing	that	questions	of	power	expressed	through	aesthetic	form	are	too	often	left	out	
of	 current	 approaches	 to	 digital	 culture,	 this	 paper	 revives	 the	 modernist	 aesthetic	
category	 of	 glamour	 in	 order	 to	 analyze	 contemporary	 forms	 of	 platformed	 cultural	
production.	Through	a	case	study	of	popular	feminism,	the	paper	traces	the	ways	in	which	
glamour,	 defined	 as	 a	 beguiling	 affective	 force	 linked	 to	 promotional	 capitalist	 logics,	
suffuses	digital	content,	metrics	and	platforms.	From	the	formal	aesthetic	codes	of	the	
ubiquitous	beauty	and	lifestyle	Instagram	feeds	that	perpetuate	the	beguiling	promise	of	
popular	 feminism,	 to	 the	enticing	 simplicity	of	online	metrics	and	scores	 that	promise	
transformative	 social	 connection	 and	 approbation,	 to	 the	 political	 economic	 drive	 for	
total	 information	awareness	and	concomitant	disciplining,	predicting	and	optimizing	of	
consumer-citizens,	the	paper	argues	that	the	ambivalent	aesthetic	of	glamour	provides	
an	apt	descriptor	and	compelling	heuristic	for	digital	cultural	production	today.	
__________________________________________	
Recalling	 the	 tributes	 to	 deceased	 actors	 and	 other	 industry	 notables	 on	
Hollywood	awards	shows,	the	“Shorty	Awards”	–	an	event	intended	to	“honour	the	best	
of	social	media”	–	included	an	“in	memoriam”	montage	for	social	media	platforms	that	
had	 gone	 out	 of	 business.	 Sombre	 music	 played	 in	 the	 background	 as	 the	 defunct	
platforms’	brand	logos	set	within	gilded	frames	moved	in	a	montage	across	the	screen.	
The	montage	was	intended	as	a	joke,	of	course;	social	media	platforms	are	far	from	glitzy	
Hollywood	actors.	Or	are	they?	These	days	platforms	like	Instagram	or	Snapchat	are,	quite	
literally,	 stealing	 the	 show	 -	 attracting,	 managing	 and	 monetizing	 our	 attention,	
propagating	new	ways	for	individuals	to	achieve	some	form	of	celebrity	status	and,	at	the	
same	time,	controlling	the	access,	conditions,	and	measures	that	constitute	that	status.	
As	 platforms	 increasingly	 mediate	 our	 cultural	 lives,	 setting	 the	 terms	 for	 valuable	
visibility	and	influence,	they	themselves	are	developing	an	unprecedented,	yet	strangely	
familiar	kind	of	power	and	 iconicity.	This	paper	argues	 that	 the	Shorty	Award’s	sketch	
contains	 an	often-disavowed	 truth	 about	 contemporary	 culture	 in	 the	digital	 age:	 the	
modernist	 aesthetic	 logics	 of	 superficial	 allure,	 feminized	 seduction,	 proximity	 at	 a	
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distance,	technological	magic,	promotional	manipulation	and	profound	ambivalence	are	
alive	and	well.	Glamour	 lives	on,	 albeit	 in	uncanny	ways,	 in	 contemporary	platformed	
cultural	production	today.		
Of	course,	in	some	senses,	the	ways	glamour	anchors	much	cultural	production	
seems	 fairly	 obvious;	within	 the	 contemporary	 context	 of	Western	 neoliberal	 popular	
feminism,	for	example,	the	politics	of	feminism	are	often	“glammed”	up	to	become	more	
palatable	 to	 a	 wide,	 popular	 audience	 (Banet-Weiser,	 2018).	 	 Feminism	 becomes	
glamorous	through	endless	 images	and	messages	that	circulate	on	social	media	about,	
among	other	things,	body	positivity	and	loving	oneself.	As	Rosalind	Gill	and	Ana	Sofia	Elias	
have	 noted,	 much	 of	 popular	 feminism	 is	 expressed	 through	 uplifting,	 cheery,	 and	
glamorous	rhetoric,	where	exhortations	to	“love	your	body”	are	communicated	through	
images	of	conventionally	beautiful,	feminine,	cis-gendered	women.		As	Gill	and	Elias	put	
it,	 “Love	 your	 body	 discourses	 are	 positive,	 affirmative,	 seemingly	 feminist-inflected	
media	messages,	targeted	exclusively	at	girls	and	women,	that	exhort	us	to	believe	we	
are	beautiful,	to	‘remember’	that	we	are	‘incredible’	and	that	tell	us	that	we	have	‘the	
power’	to	‘redefine’	the	‘rules	of	beauty’”	(Gill	and	Elias,	2014,	180).		Popular	feminism	is	
awash	with	pleas	for	women	and	girls	to	“awaken	your	incredible,”	and	to	simply	become	
more	self-confident,	while	the	structural	conditions	that	are	part	of	 the	broad	context	
that	subjugates	and	diminishes	women’s	self-confidence	are	rarely	acknowledged	(Banet-
Weiser	 2018,	 Gill	 and	 Elias	 2014).	 	 As	 Gill	 and	 Elias	 state,	 within	 “Love	 Your	 Body”	
discourses,	 “women’s	 difficult	 relationships	 to	 their	 own	 embodied	 selves	 are	 both	
dislocated	from	their	structural	determinants	in	patriarchal	capitalism	and	shorn	of	their	
psychosocial	complexity”	(Gill	and	Elias,	2014).		
This	 “dislocation”	 from	 patriarchal	 structures	 is	 no	 doubt	 exacerbated	 by	 the	
technological	affordances	and	commercial	logics	that	inform	the	social	media	platforms	
on	which	much	of	popular	feminism	depends.	Platforms,	such	as	Twitter,	Instagram	and	
Snapchat,	 not	 only	 allow	 for	 the	 rapid	 and	 broad	 spread	 of	 these	 “Love	 Your	 Body”	
messages,	but	also	assist	in	maintaining	popular	feminism	as	a	highly	visible,	surface-level	
politics	that	targets	individual	consumers	rather	than	collective	bodies.	So,	while	it	may	
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not	 be	 difficult	 to	 see	 glamour	 in	 the	 images	 of	 popular	 feminism	 circulating	 online,	
arguably	 the	 media	 platforms	 themselves,	 via	 their	 deployment	 of	 various	 types	 of	
alluring	rewards	and	metrics,	evince	a	form	of	glamour,	which	works,	in	turn,	to	obfuscate	
the	platforms’	instrumental	economic	imperatives.		
This	 paper	 will	 analyze	 the	 operations	 of	 glamour	 in	 platformed	 cultural	
production	 through	 a	 case	 study	 of	 a	 particularly	 visible	 version	 of	Western	 popular	
feminism,	focusing	on	one	notable	popular	feminist	media	campaign,	“Strong	is	the	New	
Skinny”.	 Defining	 glamour	 as	 a	 beguiling,	 superficial,	 promotionally	 driven	 kind	 of	
affective	force	involving	technological	magic,	it	will	argue	that	the	more	obvious,	image-
based	 glamour	 of	 most	 popular	 feminism	 is	 amplified	 in	 part	 because	 of	 the	 less	
acknowledged	 glamour	 of	 digital	 media	 metrics	 and	 platforms.	 The	 logics	 and	
assumptions	behind	commercial	digital	media	platforms	and	metrics	are	mostly	opaque	
to	those	who	use	them,	which,	in	turn,	produces	a	context	for	the	easy	consumption	of	
popular	feminism’s	cheery	exhortations	to	just	“be”	confident	and	love	our	bodies.		Digital	
media	metrics,	and	the	platforms	that	deploy	them,	incentivize	and	reward	a	superficial	
engagement	with,	and	rapid	circulation	of	messages	and	images	on	media	platforms,	so	
that	popular	feminist	affective	relations	threaten	to	become	about	these	metrics	alone.	
Circulation,	 popularity,	 and	 visibility	 are	 prioritized	 over	 deep	 analysis	 or	 collective	
organization	around	what	these	messages	might	mean	structurally	(Banet-Weiser,	2018,	
see	also	Dean,	2009	and	Van	Dyck,	2013).	As	it	circulates	across	multiple	platforms	then,	
popular	 feminism	marries	 feminist	politics	with	 the	 logics	of	 capitalist	 production	and	
participation	 mediated	 through	 the	 aesthetic	 practices	 of	 glamour;	 it	 is	 often	 the	
depthless,	shining	example	of	what	a	feminist	subjectivity	should,	and	could,	mean,	and	
works	to	obscure	the	complex,	material	politics	of	feminism.	Here,	we	argue	that	a	re-
assessment	of	 the	aesthetic,	 or	 affective	 impacts	of	platforms	allows	us	 to	more	 fully	
theorize	the	rise	of	popular	feminism	in	the	last	decade.			
To	be	sure,	it	may	seem	counter-intuitive	to	raise	the	issue	of	aesthetics,	especially	
the	elusive	quality	of	glamour,	 in	an	age	so	 thoroughly	saturated	by	cybernetic	 logics,	
where	 big	 data	 and	 predictive	 analytics	 claim	 to	 obviate	 the	 need	 for	 narrative	 and	
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interpretation	entirely	by	rendering	computable	(and	knowable)	the	whole	tangled	mess	
of	human	behaviour	and	culture.	The	logics	of	platform	capitalism	(Srnicek,	2017)	have	
created	 conditions	 where	 content	 no	 longer	 ‘matters’	 for	 its	 aesthetic	 qualities,	 but,	
rather,	is	valued	for	its	instrumental	function,	which	is	to	generate	a	standing	reserve	of	
data	 that	 keeps	 algorithms	 learning,	 predicting	 and	massaging	 us	 into	 new	 and	 ever	
changing	kinds	of	relations.	In	contrast,	much	of	feminist	media	studies	focuses,	and	has	
historically	focused,	on	gendered	bodies	and	how	these	bodies	are	represented	through	
particular	aesthetic	forms	on	various	media	platforms;	the	work	of	the	aesthetic	remains	
paramount	in	this	kind	of	critique	(see,	for	example,	Alias,	Gill	&	Scharff,	2017;	Dosekun,	
2017;	Ouellette,	2017;	Dale	et	al,	2016;	Ngai,	2015,	and	others).	Yet,	while	feminist	media	
scholarship	continues	to	incisively	explore	the	function	of	aesthetics	and	representation	
within	media	environments,	much	recent	media	theory	has	moved	away	from	discussions	
of	aesthetics,	narrative,	and	representation,	arguing	that	the	primary	function	of	digital	
technologies	 is	 now	 organizational,	 allocative,	 infrastructural	 or	 logistical	 (see	 for	 ex.	
Peters	2015,	Parikka	2012,	Kittler	1999,	Parks	and	Starosielski	2015).		
Given	 this	 recent	 turn	 in	 media	 theory,	 we	 deploy	 the	 aesthetic	 category	 of	
glamour	 here	 purposefully,	 as	 a	 reminder	 of	 the	 continued	 salience	 of	 aesthetic	
categories	 for	 analyses	 of	 a	 datafied	 culture.	 We	 fear	 that	 some	 current	 scholarly	
assessments	of	digital	media	tend	to	replicate,	 theoretically	and	methodologically,	 the	
same	 computational	 and	 political	 logics	 embedded	 in	 the	 developments	 they	 are	
analysing,	 thereby	 limiting	 their	 critical	 purchase.	 Are	 these	 kinds	 of	 socio-technical	
approaches	 really	 adequate	 to	 a	 critique	 of	 patriarchal	 digital	 capitalism?	 What	
theoretical	 frames	 and	modes	 of	 analysis	might	 we	 be	 leaving	 behind	 in	 our	 rush	 to	
understand	and	describe	the	seemingly	perpetual	technological	innovation	all	around	us?	
As	 some	 recent	 work	 on	 digital	 media	 platforms	 suggests,	 investigating	 internet	
infrastructures	and	materialities	should	include	a	focus	on	what	is	hidden	and	subjugated,	
such	as	race,	class	and	gender	bias,	by	the	assumed	technological	‘magic’	of	algorithms	
(see	for	ex.	Eubanks	2018,	Noble	2018,	Pasquale	2015).	Our	hope	in	deploying	glamour	
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as	a	critical	analytic	category	is	to	add	to	these	insights	and	broaden	discussions	about	
the	often	problematic,	beguiling	effects	of	much	platformed	cultural	production	today.		
	
The	work	of	glamour	
	A	corruption	of	the	term	‘grammar’	and	linked	to	the	old	French	words	‘gramaire’,	
meaning	‘books	of	spells’	and	‘grimoire,	meaning	‘obscure,	incomprehensible	discourse’,	
the	term	glamour	first	came	into	usage	in	the	early	1800s,	defined	as	an	“delusive	and	
alluring	 charm”	 (Gundle	 and	 Castelli,	 2006,	 p.	 4).	 More	 commonly	 understood	 as	 a	
product	of	the	modernist	moment,	glamour	emerged	as	a	kind	of	“secular	magic”	(Thrift,	
2008,	 p.14)	 central	 to	 the	 evolving	 “language	 of	 commercial	 seduction”	 (Gundle	 and	
Castelli,	2006,	p.	7)	that	accompanied	the	rise	of	mass	media	at	the	turn	of	the	twentieth	
century.	Glamour	 involves	a	fascination	with	the	ability	of	technology	to	arrest	and	fix	
time	 and	 so	 is	 bound	 up	 with	 the	 rise	 of	 personality	 and	 celebrity;	 the	 glossy	
depthlessness	 of	 the	 star	 image,	which	 always	 intimated	 some	 deep	 ‘truth’	 behind	 it	
(Dyer,	 1991,	 p.	 136),	 was	 industrially	 deployed	 as	 an	 infinitely	 receding	 lure	 for	 the	
growing	numbers	of	 consumers	 in	 the	market	 for	 cultural	 products.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	
constitution	 and	 deployment	 of	 glamor	 is	 a	 systematic,	 industrial	 undertaking	 –	 a	
promotional	 gambit	 purposefully	 intended	 to	 distract	 from	 the	 more	 prosaic	 and	
exploitative	aspects	of	the	culture	industries.	Definitive	of	glamour	is	that	it	can	never	be	
caught	 or	 tamed;	 as	Oscar	Wilde	writes	 about	 smoking	 in	 the	Picture	 of	 Dorian	Gray	
(2014),	glamour	“is	the	perfect	type	of	a	perfect	pleasure…	it	leaves	one	unsatisfied”	(p.	
51).	 	 Beguiling,	 seductive,	 intangible,	 always	 promising	 more,	 glamour	 depends	 on	
concealing	where	it	comes	from	and	how	it	is	made.	In	this	way,	glamour	is	a	fetish,	and	
its	 commercial	 production	 inevitably	 involves	 manipulation,	 calculation,	 “meticulous	
selection	and	control”	(Thrift,	2008,	p.	15).		Glamour,	of	course,	is	also	deeply	associated	
with	the	feminine;	it	is	women	who	have	historically	carried	the	expectation	of	‘glamour’	
and	who	most	often	conduct	the	various	kinds	of	labour	that	both	engender	and	maintain	
it.	 Finally,	 glamour	 as	 an	 aesthetic	 sensibility	 has	 been	 theorized	 as	 both	 elusive	 and	
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generative,	expressing	a	kind	of	ambivalence	or	indifference	to	the	broader	political	or	
moral	contexts	of	its	deployment	(Brown,	2009,	p.	9).		
	In	her	book	about	glamour	and	modernist	literature,	Glamour	in	Six	Dimensions,	
Judith	 Brown	 (2009)	 argues	 that	 glamour	 emerged	 as	 a	 degraded	 version	 of	 the	 18th	
century	Kantian	category	of	the	sublime,	the	extraordinary	experience	of	limitless	being,	
which	could	not	survive	the	forces	of	capitalism	and	secularization.	She	writes,	“out	of	the	
rubble…from	the	heap	of	broken	images,	could	be	cobbled	a	dim	reminder,	an	image	of	
impossible	desire,	a	fantasy	of	proximity,	through	glamour”	(p.13).	Noting	that	glamour	
is	often	dismissed	by	theorists	as	simply	an	effect	of	consumerism,	Brown	 insists	 that,	
while	 glamour	 is	 linked	 to	 commodity	 capitalism,	 it	 is	 also	 “something	 distinctly	
modernist,	formal,	and	tied	to	less	material	concerns	than	the	production	and	packaging	
of	 goods”	 (p.	1).	 	Glamour,	 then,	 is	both	a	 “capacious”	aesthetic	 technique	 serving	 to	
further	 entrench	 capitalism	 and	 a	 “wispy”	 promise	 of	 some	 thing	 or	 value	 beyond	
capitalism	 (p.9);	 in	 either	 sense	 it	 comprises	 a	 kind	 of	affective	 force.	 And,	while	 the	
aesthetic	 of	 glamour	 is	 often	 dismissed	 as	 ‘simply’	 aesthetics,	 Brown	 asks	 us	 to	 see	
glamour	as	 comprising	a	 logic	 in	 its	own	 right,	 as	a	key	analytic,	 rather	 than	merely	a	
description	of	something	else.	 	Glamour,	Brown	argues,	is	at	stake	in	any	discussion	of	
linking,	for	example,	literature	to	modernism,	and	their	interrelation.	
We	would	 like	 to	extend	Brown’s	analysis	and	argue	 for	 the	 importance	of	 the	
aesthetic	 form	 of	 glamour	 as	 both	 an	 apt	 descriptor	 and	 a	 key	mode	 of	 analysis	 for	
platformed	 cultural	 production.	 To	 be	 clear,	 we	 are	 not	 arguing	 that	 all	 platformed	
production	is	glamorous	in	the	term’s	everyday	sense	as	‘beautiful’	or	’exciting’.	This	is	
obviously	 not	 the	 case.	 Rather,	 in	 this	 paper	 we	 are	 appropriating	 the	 multiple	
significations	of	the	term	‘glamour’	and	focusing	on	its	twinned	facets	-	as	commodity	and	
ineffable	quality,	descriptor	and	analytical	frame	-	in	order	to	analyze	the	media	texts	and	
images,	metrics	and	platforms	that	comprise	popular	feminism.	Glamour,	Brown	(2009)	
argues,	 emphasizes	 the	 “formality	 of	 stasis	 over	 movement,	 beauty	 over	 productive	
activity”;	“it	relies	on	abstraction;	on	the	thing	translated	into	the	idea	and	thus	the	loss	
of	the	thing	itself”	(p.	5).	Like	the	seductive	glamour	of	Jean	Harlow	or	Marilyn	Monroe,	
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the	accommodating	quality	of	popular	feminism,	its	breezy	and	friendly	expression,	while	
wrapped	up	in	the	technological	promise	of	immediacy	and	intimacy,	is	deeply	marked	by	
technology’s	 cold,	 distancing	 effects.	 In	 its	 wide	 circulation	 and	 complex	 forms	 of	
commodification,	popular	 feminism	can	potentially	 lose	“the	 thing	 itself”,	 in	 this	 case,	
feminist	politics	and	critiques	of	structural	patriarchy,	its	activism,	and	its	histories.		
	
Aesthetics	and	digital	production	
Certainly	 aesthetic	 practices	 in	 digital	 content	 production	 are	 alive	 and	 well;	
bloggers,	 social	media	 influencers,	 and	youtubers	operate	 firmly	on	 the	 terrain	of	 the	
aesthetic,	using	the	body,	fashion,	and	beauty	to	generate	feelings	and	attachments,	in	
the	 hope	 of	 getting	 paid.	 Media	 scholars,	 especially	 feminist	 media	 scholars,	 have	
employed	 a	 variety	 of	 adjectives	 to	 describe	 this	 personally	 expressive	 online	 work:	
aspirational	labour	(Duffy,	2017),	visibility	labour	(Abidin,	2016),	relational	labour	(Baym,	
2014),	 reputational	 labour	 (Gandini,	 2016),	 glamour	 labour	 (Wissinger,	 2015)	 and	
aesthetic	labour	(Warhurst	and	Nickson,	2007)	to	name	a	few.	The	vast	majority	of	these	
concepts	draw	from	earlier	critics’	attempts	to	map	capitalisms’	growing	penetration	into	
all	aspects	of	our	lives	and	its	monetization	of	affect	and	subjectivity;	these	include	Arlie	
Hochschild’s	 (1983)	work	on	emotional	 labour,	Mauricio	Lazzarato’s	 (1996)	concept	of	
immaterial	 labour,	 and	Michael	Hardt’s	 (1999)	 theory	 of	 affective	 labour.	 All	 of	 these	
concepts	 stress	 the	 intangible,	 aesthetic,	 communicative,	 performative	 and	 deeply	
feminized	 qualities	 of	 online	 work.	 Leaving	 aside	 questions	 about	 whether	 this	 work	
constitutes	 ‘labour’	 strictly	 speaking	 or	 whether	 the	 content	 itself	 is	 aesthetically	
interesting,	 there	 can	 be	 no	 doubt	 that	 digital	 platforms	 are	wholly	 dependent	 upon	
aesthetic	practices	and	appeals	in	order	to	maintain	their	bottom	line.	
While	 there	 is	much	to	be	gained	 from	theorizing	 the	nature	of	digital	content	
production,	 in	 this	 paper	 we	 wish	 to	 shift	 the	 emphasis	 somewhat	 -	 from	 forms	 of	
aesthetic	work	to	the	work	of	aesthetic	form.	Following	Terry	Eagleton	(1998),	we	do	not	
wish	to	naturalize	the	concept	of	the	aesthetic,	but	see	its	definition	as	always	already	
ideological,	defined	with	and	against	dominant	forms	of	socio-technical	‘rationality’.	As	
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Eagleton	points	out,	when	the	concept	of	the	aesthetic	first	emerged	in	the	18th	century	
as	 the	 direct	 apprehension	 of	 experience	 through	 the	 senses,	 it	 was	 positioned	 as	 a	
‘feminized’	supplement	to,	and	reaffirmation	of	Enlightenment	reason;	by	making	room	
for	the	sensual	world	of	individual	tastes	and	pleasures,	the	rule	of	rationality	and	its	law	
could	remain	intact.	A	new	kind	of	aestheticized	subjectivity	emerged	at	this	time	as	well,	
accompanying	the	shift	from	direct	political	coercion	to	hegemony;	“like	the	work	of	art”,	
this	new	aestheticized	subject	“introjects	the	Law	which	governs	it	as	the	very	principle	
of	its	free	identity	and	so,	in	an	Althusserian	phrase,	comes	to	work	"all	by	itself,"	without	
need	of	political	constraint”	(p.	329).		Following	Eagleton,	we	contend	that	the	‘aesthetic’	
is	not	a	passive	quality	found	“in”	texts,	rather,	 it	signifies	affective,	bodily	 impact	and	
performs	a	kind	of	political	and	cultural	work,	especially	in	relation	to	subjectivity.	Indeed,	
we	argue	that	the	tendencies	described	by	Eagleton	have	only	intensified	in	the	age	of	
platform	 capitalism;	 here,	 “structures	 of	 power”	 become	 “structures	 of	 feeling”	 and	
“pleasurable	conduct”	emerges	as	“the	true	 index	of	successful	 social	hegemony,	self-
delight	the	very	mark	of	social	submission”	(Eagleton,	1998,	p.	330).	But	what	aesthetic	
form	best	characterizes	platformed	cultural	production	today?		
There	have	been	several	notable	attempts	to	define	a	new	kind	of	aesthetics	for	
the	digital	age.	Lev	Manovich	(2015)	has	traced	the	emergence	of	what	he	calls	an	‘info-
aesthetics’,	tracking	the	ways	the	computational	 logics	of	software,	protocols,	screens,	
search,	databases	and	interfaces	are	shaping	a	whole	range	of	cultural	phenomena	and	
resulting	 in,	 among	 other	 things,	 new	 senses	 of	 scale	 and	 temporality.	 Focusing	 on	
contemporary	 visual	 arts,	 Frederic	 Jameson	 (2015)	 theorizes	 a	 new	 ‘aesthetics	 of	
singularity’	 (p.	123)	best	represented	by	the	art	 installation.	Existing	only	 in	the	 ‘now’,	
installations	embody	performative	strategies	that	are	re-made	every	time	an	individual	
viewer	engages	with	them;	they	are	“one-time	devices,	which	must	be	thrown	away	once	
the	trick	–a	singularity-	has	been	performed”	(p.	113).	Noting	the	parallels	between	the	
art	world	and	the	global	financial	market,	Jameson	claims	the	installation	mirrors	the	logic	
of	 the	 derivative	 contract,	 enacting	 “a	 single	 bright	 idea	 which,	 combining	 form	 and	
content,	can	be	repeated	ad	infinitum	until	the	artist’s	name	takes	on	a	kind	of	content	
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of	 its	own”	 (p.	112).	 In	 line	with	 the	 rise	of	 ‘fictitious’	 finance	capitalism	 (Marx,	1993,	
Durand,	2017)	and	the	centrality	of	reputation	management	and	marketing	to	it	(Harvey,	
1990,	 Lazzarato	2004,	Hearn,	2010),	 galleries	and	artists	 are	now	brands,	 their	 formal	
promotional	contours	more	important	than	the	quality	of	their	service	or	work.	Ed	Finn	
(2017)	echoes	Manovich’s	and	Jameson’s	claims	about	the	primacy	of	form,	or	platform,	
interface,	 promotion,	 and	 the	 engendering	 of	 multiplicities	 of	 singular,	 hyper-
personalized	 experiences	 in	what	 he	 calls	 an	 ‘aesthetics	 of	 abstraction’:	 “an	 ethos	 of	
simplification	 that	 requires	 abstracting	 away	 complex	 and	 messy	 details	 in	 order	 to	
deliver	a	reliable	and	persistent	set	of	services”	(p.	97).	Citing	Uber’s	glossy	user	interface	
that	 papers	 over	 the	 messy	 material	 realities	 of	 the	 cars,	 drivers	 and	 their	 working	
conditions,	Finn	argues	that	these	platforms	are	engaged	in	a	form	of	algorithmic	user-
arbitrage;	as	they	insert	themselves	into	our	lives	as	experiential	middle-men,	they	come,	
“not	merely	to	enact	our	decisions,	but	to	control	the	decision	pathways,	the	space	of	
agency”	 (p.	 97).	 For	 example,	 as	 Netflix	 informationalizes	 cultural	 content	 to	 create	
classification,	search	and	recommender	systems,	it	not	only	shows	us	the	movies	we	like	
but	also	tells	us	how	to	think	about	them,	inserting	itself	seamlessly	into	the	formation	of	
our	individual	aesthetic	preferences.		
Manovich,	Jameson	and	Finn	collectively	point	to	an	informational	aesthetic	based	
on	abstraction,	surface	or	interface,	which	reduces	content	to	form,	prioritizes	the	meta-
logics	of	 the	promotional	and	the	branded,	relies	on	arcane	techniques,	and	functions	
seductively	 to	 provide	 a	 hyper	 personalized	 experience	 and	 a	 sense	 of	 proximity	 at	 a	
distance.	We	contend	that	these	aesthetic	qualities	and	their	effects	are	not	at	all	new,	
however.	 Taken	 together	 they	echo	 those	of	 an	older,	more	 familiar	 aesthetic	 form	–	
glamour	–	functioning	now	in	a	commercially	driven,	digital	register.	Apparently,	while	
techniques	 of	 communication	 may	 have	 changed	 significantly	 in	 the	 digital	 age,	 the	
industrial	 logics	and	 interests	driving	 their	design	and	operation	continue	to	engender	
and	rely	on	aesthetic	strategies	similar	to	those	used	in	the	earliest	years	of	the	culture	
industries.		
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Popular	Feminism	and	the	glamour	of	the	image	
As	a	way	to	think	through	the	ways	aesthetics,	and	glamour	specifically,	operate	
in	 forms	 of	 platformed	 cultural	 production,	 we	 focus	 on	 the	 case	 study	 of	 popular	
feminism.	 	Popular	feminism	is	a	particularly	salient	case	study	because	 it	 is	a	political	
platform	in	its	own	right,	but	is	also	deeply	dependent	upon	and	conditioned	by	the	logics	
of	commercial	digital	platforms	themselves.	While	there	are	different	versions	of	popular	
feminism,	here	we	 focus	on	highly	 visible,	well-circulated,	neoliberal	Western	popular	
feminisms;	the	images,	messages,	and	affirmations	of	feminism	that	do	not	acknowledge,	
let	alone	critique,	the	capitalist	platforms	on	which	they	are	created	and	circulated.		Some	
popular	 feminist	 themes,	 such	 as	 Love	 Your	 Body	 discourses	 and	 self-confidence	
initiatives,	 lend	 themselves	more	 easily	 to	 these	 commercial	 platforms	 and	 achieve	 a	
heightened	visibility	as	a	result.	Banet-Weiser	argues	that,		
(a)s	a	set	of	practices	and	expressions	that	circulate	in	an	economy		
of	visibility,	popular	feminism	is	part	of	the	larger	“attention”		
economy,	where	its	sheer	accessibility—through	shared	images,		
likes,	clicks,	followers,	retweets,	and	the	like—is	a	key	component		
of	its	popularity.		And,	this	popularity	and	accessibility	are	measured		
in	and	through	its	ability	to	increase	that	visibility;	popular	feminism		
engages	in	a	feedback	loop,	where	it	is	more	popular	when	it	is		
more	visible,	which	then	authorizes	it	to	create	ever-increasing		
visibility”	(Banet-Weiser,	2018,	21).		
In	this	way,	popular	feminisms	compete	for	visibility	and	attention	with	other	feminisms	
in	this	social	media	economy.			
As	 feminist	 theorists	 such	 as	 Susan	 Douglas,	 Angela	 McRobbie,	 Diane	 Negra,	
Yvonne	 Tasker	 and	Rosalind	Gill	 (among	others)	 have	 pointed	 out,	 representations	 of	
feminists	 as	 angry,	 defiant,	 man-hating	 women	 have	 dominated	 media	 platforms	
historically	(Douglas,	1994;	2010;	McRobbie,	2008;	Negra	and	Tasker,	2007;	Gill,	2007).	
But,	 as	 Rosalind	 Gill	 and	 Catherine	 Rottenberg	 contend,	 media	 representations	 of	
feminisms	are	always	contested	and	contradictory	(Gill,	2007;	Rottenberg,	2018).		In	the	
contemporary	moment	(especially	in	North	America	and	Europe),	media	manifestations	
of	post-,	neoliberal,	and	popular	 feminisms	often	directly	challenge	representations	of	
feminism	 as	 angry	 and	 exclusionary	 (Gill,	 Rottenberg,	 Banet-Weiser,	 2019).	 Since	 the	
 11 
1990s,	 Western	 popular	 culture	 has	 maintained,	 what	 Gill	 calls,	 a	 “post-feminist	
sensibility,”	 a	 set	 of	 ideas,	 images	 and	 meanings	 where	 feminism	 is	 repudiated	 and	
disavowed,	 and	 women	 are	 seen	 to	 be	 imbued	 with	 freedom	 of	 choice,	 individual	
capacity,	and	are	self-optimizing	in	both	body	and	mind	(Gill,	2007).		Post-feminist	culture	
clearly	positions	women	as	empowered	individuals,	with	seemingly	unending	capacity	for	
economic	and	personal	success.	Thus,	post-feminism	comprises	an	affective	relation	with	
individuals,	 not	 with	 collective	 politics	 or	 structural	 change.	 All	 of	 this	 post-feminist	
empowerment	 fails	 to	explain	continued	structural	gendered	 inequalities,	however.	 In	
the	contemporary	moment,	post-feminist	culture	sits	(often	uneasily)	side-by-side	with	
what	Catherine	Rottenberg	has	called	“neoliberal	feminism”	and	Banet-Weiser	has	called	
“popular	 feminism”,	which	are	differentiated	from	post-feminism	in	the	way	that	they	
“clearly	 avow	 gender	 inequality	 [yet]	 simultaneously	 disavow	 the	 socio-economic	 and	
cultural	 structures	 shaping	 our	 lives.	 This	 feminism	 also	 helps	 spawn	 a	 new	 feminist	
subject,	one	who	accepts	full	responsibility	for	her	own	well-being	and	self-care.”	(Banet-
Weiser,	Gill,	and	Rottenberg,	2019,	5).		
Examples	of	mediated	popular	feminism	abound,	and	they	do	not	have	the	same	
affective	value,	politics,	or	reach.	But	it	is	clear	that	in	the	contemporary	moment,	some	
versions	of	feminism	have	become	“popular:”		
It	feels	as	if	everywhere	you	turn,	there	is	an	expression	of		
feminism—on	a	t-shirt,	in	a	movie,	in	the	lyrics	of	a	pop	song,	i	
n	an	inspirational	Instagram	post.		Feminism	is	“popular”	in	[that	it}		
manifests	in	discourses	and	practices	that	are	circulated	in		
popular	and	commercial	media,	such	as	digital	spaces	like	blogs,		
Instagram,	and	Twitter,	as	well	as	broadcast	media.	[Additionally],		
the	“popular”	of	popular	feminism	signifies	the	condition	of	being		
liked	or	admired	by	like-minded	people	and	groups,	as	popularity		
(Banet-Weiser,	2018,	p.7)	
While	 recognizing	 that	 gendered	 relations	 of	 power	 marginalize	 women,	 this	 “new	
feminist	subject”	critiques	gender	inequities	in	a	friendly,	safe	and	glamorous	way.		It	is	
not	only	the	case	that	this	version	of	popular	feminism	is	decidedly	not	angry	(and	indeed,	
anger	 (at	 sexism,	 racism,	 patriarchy,	 abuse)	 seems	 to	 be	 an	 old-fashioned	 vestige	 for	
these	popular	feminisms),	it	is	also	the	case	that	the	aesthetic	form	of	popular	feminism	
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works	 to	 obfuscate	 its	 structural	 underpinnings.		 The	 glamour	 of	 popular	 feminism	
authorizes	it	to	be	an	accommodating	feminism,	and,	as	we	will	see,	this	strategy	is	not	
just	conducive	to	corporate	expression;	it	in	part	exists	in	order	to	become	available	to	
corporate	expression	(Banet-Weiser,	2018).		Again,	we	can	see	this	in	popular	feminism’s	
endlessly	cheery	“love	your	body”	messages,	messages	that	are	part	of	an	“aesthetics	of	
abstraction”	 (Finn,	 2017),	 where	 the	 history	 and	 complexities	 of	 feminist	 politics	 are	
eclipsed	by	the	easily	circulated,	superficial	visibility	of	a	glamorous	popular	feminism.		
Again,	 the	 ‘popular’	 of	 popular	 feminism	 also	 means	 it	 is	 connected	 to	 the	
attention	economy.	 	That	is,	the	circulation	of	popular	feminism	depends	on	numbers:	
followers,	likes,	and	retweets,	dollars	from	the	sale	of	popular	feminist	merchandise,	and	
popular	 feminist	 brands	 and	 businesses	 that	 emerge	 from	 this	 economy.	 	 Within	
neoliberal	brand	culture,	only	some	feminist	expressions	and	politics	are	‘brandable’	and	
commensurate	with	market	logics:	those	that	focus	on	the	individual	body,	connect	social	
change	 with	 corporate	 capitalism,	 and	 emphasize	 individual	 attributes,	 such	 as	
confidence,	self-esteem	and	competence	as	particularly	useful	to	neoliberal	self-reliance	
and	capitalist	success.	Crucially,	‘brandable’	feminist	expressions	and	politics	often	rely	
on	 the	 work	 of	 glamour;	 not	 only	 because	 these	 expressions	 of	 feminism	 follow	
conventional	 definitions	 of	 beauty	 (meaning	 white,	 thin,	 and	 cis-gendered),	 but	 also	
because	branded	popular	feminism	circulates	on	social	media,	and	there	works	to	mystify	
and	obscure	the	sexism,	racism	and	misogyny	“baked	in”	to	the	algorithms	and	design	of	
these	platforms	(Noble	2018,	Crawford,	2013).		
On	social	media	sites	such	as	Instagram,	Twitter	and	Tumblr,	we	are	flooded	with	
popular	feminist	images	and	aspirational	messages	that	position	the	female	body	in	a	
glamorous	frame	as	a	conduit	to	empowerment.		One	in	particular	is	a	lifestyle	brand	
and	marketing	campaign	directed	at	women	that	has	framed	the	participation	of	
women	in	the	sports	and	fitness	industries:	“Strong	is	the	New	Skinny.”	This	campaign	
ostensibly	focuses	on	women’s	health	and	getting	strong,	but	it	also	re-inscribes	
gendered	norms	about	the	thin,	hyper-feminine	body.	The	use	of	the	term	“skinny”	
indicates	an	allegiance	to	hegemonic	norms	of	femininity;	to	be	“strong”	here	is	not	to	
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be	athletic	and	overly	muscular.		As	Anthony	Papathomas	points	out,	about	this	
movement,	“the	athletic	and	the	feminine	ideal	represent	two	contradictory	masters;	to	
serve	one	is	to	reject	the	other.”	(Papathomas,	2018;	see	also	Toffoletti,	Thorpe,	and	
Francombe-Webb,	2018	for	more	on	“sporting	femininities”).		 The	campaign	also	taps	
into	the	vague	“empowerment”	promises	of	popular	feminism,	suggesting	
empowerment	comes	with	having	the	appropriately	feminine	body	(Papathomas,	2018).	
Additionally,	part	of	popular	feminism	is	the	emergence	of	an	industry	of	
empowerment,	and	“Strong	is	the	New	Skinny”	capitalizes	on	this	industry.		Beginning	
with	Jennifer	Cohen	and	Stacey	Colino’s	2014	best-selling	self-help	book,	Strong	is	the	
New	Skinny:	How	to	Eat,	Live	and	Move	to	Maximize	Your	Power,	“Strong	is	the	New	
Skinny”	has	become	a	social	media	campaign,	motto,	hashtag	and	merchandising	
franchise	for	women	and	fitness	programs.		As	Cohen	and	Colino	state,	“It’s	time	for	a	
new	conversation—and	a	new	plan	for	treating,	feeding,	and	moving	your	body	in	ways	
that	build	on	your	strengths	inside	and	out.	Strong	is	sexy.	Strong	is	powerful.	Strong	is	
achievable.”	(Cohen	and	Colino,	2014,	p.	17).	The	most	recent	iteration	of	“Strong	is	the	
New	Skinny”	is	a	similar	campaign	directed	at	girls	rather	than	women:	“Strong	is	the	
New	Pretty”.	Starting	on	social	media	as	a	popular	photo	project	about	girls	being	strong	
(broadly	defined	as	athletic,	brave,	or	loyal)	by	a	mother	and	former	athlete,	this	
project,	with	the	tagline	“A	Celebration	of	Girls	Being	Themselves”,	went	viral	in	the	
spring	of	2014	and	has	subsequently	become	a	book	(Parker,	2017).		On	the	face	of	it,	
there	is	little	to	critique	about	such	projects.		However,	we	want	to	point	out	that	these	
kinds	of	popular	feminist	campaigns	rely	on	three	intersecting	dynamics:	media	
circulation,	metrics,	and	platforms	–	all	of	which	are	marked	by	the	visual	codes	and	
instrumental	logics	of	glamour.		Recall	that	these	“strong	is	the	new...	“	campaigns	rely	
on	dominant	assumptions	about	what	typically	comprises	‘glamour’:	they	are	both	
skinny	and	pretty.		 
		Thus,	 “Strong	 is	 the	 New	 Skinny”	 can	 be	 positioned	 alongside	 other	
contemporary	 empowerment	discourses	 and	practices	 in	 the	 last	 five	 years	 that	 have	
been	directed	to	girls	and	women.		For	example,	companies	such	as	Verizon,	CoverGirl,	
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Always,	Dove	and	Chevy	have	produced	multiple	emotional	advertising	campaigns,	urging	
us	to	pay	closer	attention	to	girls	and	the	opportunities	available	to	them	both	personally	
and	 professional.	 As	 Kim	 Toffoletti,	 Holly	 Thorpe	 and	 Jessica	 Francombe-Webb	 have	
astutely	 argued,	 sports	 and	 athletics	 have	 become	 a	 crucial	 vehicle	 for	 these	
empowerment	 campaigns,	where	 images	 and	 successes	 of	 strong	 female	 athletes	 are	
positioned	as	a	solution	to	the	problems	of	female	empowerment	(Toffoletti,	Thorpe,	and	
Francombe-Webb,	2018).	 	 Importantly,	 these	messages	of	“strong”	empowerment	are	
framed	within	 the	aesthetics	of	glamour;	as	Brown	 (2009)	points	out,	 the	aesthetic	of	
glamour	 “favors	 blankness,	 the	 polished	 surface...	 yet	 somehow	 this	 blankness	 is	
transmuted	into	something	that	is	seductive,	powerful	and	often	simply	gorgeous”	(p.	5).	
	 Images	of	“Strong	is	the	New	Skinny”	are	indeed	seductive,	powerful,	and	
gorgeous	precisely	because	conventional	understandings	of	the	gendered	and	raced	
body	continue	to	shape	media	representations,	sponsorships,	and	endorsements.		But	
who	is	being	empowered	by	these	mediated	images	and	messages?		What	bodies	are	
“worthy”	of	endorsements?	As	Toffoletti	et	al	point	out,	the	mytho-poetic	narrative	of	
sports	has	recently	expanded	to	include	mythologies	about	female	empowerment,	but	
these	representations	of	women’s	athletic	participation	tend	to	be	framed	within	the	
discourses	of	post-feminism,	commodity	feminism	and	emerging	forms	of	popular	
feminism	(Toffoletti,	Thorpe,	Francombe-Webb,	2018).	As	a	result,	in	spite	of	their	
meritocratic	rhetoric,	these	mythologies	of	female	empowerment	are	often	conditioned	
by	the	superficial	promotional	logics	of	glamour,	and	tend	to	be	directed	at	white,	
conventionally	feminine	bodies,	keeping	intact	established	ideologies	and	practices	
about	the	ideal	raced	and	gendered	body.			
Certainly	on	the	surface,	“Strong	is	the	New	Skinny”	appears	to	challenge	the	
more	taken	for	granted	qualities	of	glamour,	insofar	as	it	claims	to	reject	thinness	as	a	
beauty	ideal;	ostensibly,	it	is	about	a	more	achievable	“real”	body,	one	that	is	about	
strength	rather	than	weakness,	a	solid	female	body	rather	than	a	“wispy”	one.	Yet	the	
images	connected	with	this	campaign	that	circulate	on	social	media,	especially	the	
visually-oriented	Instagram,	are	very	familiar;	they	portray	conventional,	idealized	
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feminine	bodies	wrapped	up	in	the	guise	of	“health.”		Indeed,	the	role	of	social	media	is	
not	insignificant	here;	as	Roisin	Kiberd	writes	in	The	Guardian:	“The	new	brand	of	body	
fascism	isn’t	just	about	fat	and	thin:	‘healthy’	now	functions	as	an	aspirational	hashtag,	
one	arguably	more	powerful,	self-righteous	and	potentially	misleading	than	‘thin’	ever	
managed	to	be.	Fed	on	a	diet	of	health	blogs	and	images	labeled	as	‘fitspo,’	we	risk	
confusing	what	is	healthy	with	what	attracts	the	most	clicks”	(Kiberd,	2015).	The	
“strong”	body	remains	a	mediated	image	circulated	within	an	economy	of	visibility,	
where	visibility	is	an	end	in	itself,	and	where	the	superficial	allure	of	glamour	conditions	
the	context	for	visibility	(Banet-Weiser	2018).		As	we	discuss	later,	visually-oriented	
platforms	such	as	Instagram	are	increasingly	the	site	for	identity-making	online;	as	Alice	
Marwick	has	argued,	“the	Internet	is	increasingly	a	visual	medium,	and	more	and	more	
individuals	are	using	images	rather	than	written	self-descriptions	to	express	themselves”	
(Marwick,	2015).		Thus,	“Strong	is	the	New	Skinny”	is	more	about	the	image	of	a	strong	
female	body,	and	how	often	and	widely	this	image	is	circulated,	than	it	is	about	
empowering	women	with	strong	bodies	to	then	challenge	patriarchal	norms	or	
institutionalized	racism.	
But,	as	mentioned,	the	glamorous	images	of	“Strong	is	the	New	Skinny”	do	not	
just	represent	any	body.	Though	there	are	images	of	women	of	color	within	this	
discourse,	the	body	that	is	regularized	and	recognized	is	primarily	the	thin,	mostly	
white,	toned	body,	with	no	signs	of	labour	except	the	labour	of	extreme	exercise	that	
comes	with	expensive	gym	memberships	and	personal	trainers.			When	looking	through	
the	fitspo	hashtag	it	is	impossible	not	to	view	the	successful	body	as	a	white	body	or	at	
the	very	least,	as	a	(sometimes)	ambiguously	racialized	body.	
	
Popular	feminism	and	the	glamour	of	the	metric		
The	impact	of	these	glamorous	popular	feminist	images	is	measured	by	metrics,	
of	course	–	the	coveted	likes,	retweets,	friend	and	follower	counts	that	annotate	all	kinds	
of	platformed	self-expression.	As	T.M.	Porter	(1995)	has	famously	noted,	quantification	
is	 well	 “suited	 for	 communication	 that	 goes	 beyond	 the	 boundaries	 of	 locality	 and	
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community”	(p.	ix).	But,	even	as	numbers	give	off	a	sense	that	whatever	knowledge	they	
represent	is	produced	“independent	of	the	particular	people	who	make	it”,	reinforcing	a	
belief	in	objectivity,	Porter	argues	that	they	actually	imply	“nothing	about	truth	to	nature”	
and	“have	more	to	do	with	the	exclusion	of	judgment,	the	struggle	against	subjectivity”	
(p.	 ix).	 Under	 these	 conditions,	 ‘objectivity’,	 represented	 by	 numbers	 and	 data,	 and	
deployed	 in	 fields	 like	politics	and	science,	“names	a	set	of	 strategies	 for	dealing	with	
distance	and	distrust”	(emphasis	added,	p.	ix).	In	this	era	of	total	computation,	faith	in	
numbers	 is,	 of	 course,	 foundational.	 Certainly,	 the	 apparent	 objective	 indifference	 of	
numbers	works	to	reinforce	celebratory	discourses	about	the	egalitarian,	democratizing	
nature	of	much	social	media.	Helen	Kennedy	and	Rosemary	Hill	(2017)	build	on	Porter’s	
insights	 to	argue	 that,	 in	addition	 to	any	 rational	understanding	 they	might	engender,	
numbers	and	data	provoke	feelings	and	emotions	in	people	as	well.	In	other	words,	data	
and	 metrics	 have	 distinct	 aesthetic	 qualities	 that	 derive	 from	 their	 contexts	 of	
deployment	and	modes	of	representation.	These	aesthetic	qualities	are	part	and	parcel	
of	the	kind	of	strategic	ideological	work	Porter	suggests	‘objectivity’	does.	In	this	sense,	
then,	we	can	argue	that	metrics	have	affective	force.	
In	so	far	as	social	media	metrics	work	to	manage	distance,	reduce	complexity	and	
function	as	strategies	of	incentive	and	enticement,	they	are	the	very	epitome	of	glamour.	
As	we	have	argued,	the	aesthetic	logics	of	glamour	involve	a	kind	of	shiny	depthlessness,	
a	 form	of	 superficial	 expression	 that	promises	access	 to	depth,	but	 actually	precludes	
penetration	 or	 analysis,	 receding	 whenever	 we	 get	 too	 close.	 In	 terms	 of	 popular	
feminism,	we	note	that	this	surface	expression	obscures,	in	often	spectacular	ways,	the	
complex,	material	politics	of	feminism.	Consider	again	the	example	of	“fitspo.”	The	key	to	
“fitspo”	is	public	sharing	-	and	public	shaming	-	so	that	personal	inspiration	comes	from	
clicks,	 likes,	and	 followers.	As	Kiberd	reports,	one	 fitspo	advocate,	 Jess	Semmens,	was	
advised	 by	 doctors	 to	 lose	weight;	 her	 commitment	 to	 following	 that	 advice	 involved	
photographing	every	meal	 and	 then	 circulating	 the	 images	on	 social	media.	 Semmens	
claims	 that	 she	 lost	 30	 pounds	 by	 “instagramming	 herself	 thin”,	 suggesting	 that	 the	
approval	of	her	online	 followers	expressed	 in	comments	and	 likes	was	more	powerful	
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incentive	 than	 any	 medical	 argument	 could	 have	 been	 (Kiberd,	 2015).	 But,	 as	 Roisin	
Kiberd	asks	about	 this	 trend,	 is	 the	“healthiest”	diet	 the	one	with	 the	most	 likes?	 Is	 it	
healthy	to	crowdsource	your	body	 image	and	 let	 the	 internet	take	over	your	real	 life?	
Semmens	explains	that	her	weight	loss	was	due	to	the	fact	that	she	openly	courted	peer	
pressure:	“If	I	didn’t	stick	to	the	diet	I	wasn’t	just	letting	myself	down,	I’d	be	letting	down	
all	my	followers	too.”	(Kiberd,	2015)	
The	individualist	ethic	expressed	in	this	discourse	makes	an	explicit	equivalence	
between	empowerment,	a	fit	body,	and	individual	achievement,	unsurprisingly	failing	to	
acknowledge	structural	and	systemic	inequalities.	And	yet,	while	there	might	be	no	one	
else	to	“blame”,	there	is,	apparently,	everyone	to	“let	down”.	The	dynamic	of	social	media	
conjures	a	kind	of	collective	body;	after	all,	“crowdsourcing	your	body	image”	not	only	
means	 constructing	 your	 ‘self’	 in	 response	 to	 your	 social	 media	 followers,	 but	 also	
positioning	 your	 ‘self’	 as	 a	 function	 of	 your	 followers’	 appreciation	 and	 recognition.	
Metrics	 are	 the	 medium	 through	 which	 this	 kind	 of	 collective	 construction	 and	
authorization	of	self	is	expressed	and	navigated.	Given	the	fact	these	metrics	stand	in	for	
social	 approval	 and	 recognition,	 it	 is	 little	wonder	 they	 are	 so	 beguiling;	 they	 convey	
intimacy,	proximity,	a	fantasy	of	total	belonging	and	acceptance,	and	yet	there	can’t	ever	
be	enough	of	them	to	fully	satiate	our	desire	for	self-acceptance	or	truly	reveal	what	lies	
at	the	core	of	our	being.	
The	idea	of	“crowdsourcing	your	body	image”	makes	sense	in	an	era	of	what	
Alice	Marwick	has	called		“insta-fame,”	where	the	empowerment	that	comes	from	
posting	these	images	is	one	that	is	fleeting	and	non-structural,	about	precarious	fame	
rather	than	about	changing	social	inequities	or	the	ways	a	woman’s	body	is	valued	
culturally,	politically,	or	economically	(Marwick,	2015).	Instagram	traffics	in	the	
“aspirational,”	which	Marwick	identifies	as	“marketing	jargon	for	something	people	
desire	to	own	but	usually	cannot”	(Marwick,	2015,	see	also	Duffy,	2018).	Marwick	
continues,	“(t)hus	Instafame	is	not	egalitarian	but	rather	reinforces	an	existing	hierarchy	
of	fame,	in	which	the	iconography	of	glamour,	luxury,	wealth,	good	looks,	and	
connections	is	reinscribed	in	a	visual	digital	medium.	The	presence	of	an	attentive	
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audience	may	be	the	most	potent	status	symbol	of	all.”	In	this	context,	“Strong	is	the	
New	Skinny”	works	to	reinforce	the	idea	that	the	body	is	the	core	value	of	a	woman’s	
identity.		Some	call	these	practices	“visual	health;”	here,	posting	images	on	social	media	
in	order	to	be	evaluated	is	transmuted	into	evidence	of	a	woman’s	commitment	to	
health	in	general.	Clearly,	this	is	related	to	the	now	normative	practice	of	self-branding,	
where	the	image	of	the	body,	what	one	looks	like,	how	one	circulates	on	multiple	media	
platforms,	becomes	personal	identity	and	self-worth.		The	self-brand,	like	other	kinds	of	
brands,	relies	on	standardized	codes	of	the	body,	and,	importantly,	relies	on	the	
accumulation	of	numbers:	followers,	likes,	retweets	and	so	on	(Hearn	2008,	Banet-
Weiser	2012,	Marwick	2013).		
While	most	 people	 recognize	 that	metrics,	 in	 the	 form	 of	 followers,	 likes	 and	
retweets,	 mean	 something,	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 users	 are	 generally	 unaware	 of	 the	
algorithmic	logics	underpinning	metrics	or	the	myriad	ways	platforms	work	to	keep	these	
logics	hidden.	Nonetheless,	users	remain	emotionally	invested	them.	This	may	be	because	
these	apparently	simple	scores	and	metrics	provide	us	with	a	way	to	make	judgments	and	
find	a	path	through	the	mountains	of	information	and	attention-seeking	material	online.	
More	 likely	 it	 is	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 these	 metrics	 appear	 to	 be	 legitimate	 external	
reflections	of	our	own	social	worth	and,	if	we	can	drive	them	up,	they	promise	access	to	
new	 worlds	 of	 micro-celebrity	 and	 reputational	 capital.	 As	 Benjamin	 Grosser	 (2014),	
inventor	of	 the	Facebook	 ‘demetricator’,	argues,	 the	use	of	personal	metrics	on	social	
media	and	the	inescapable	desire	to	increase	them,	is	intricately	bound	up	with	the	more	
general	 capitalist	 tendency	 toward	 perpetual	 growth;	 “within	 our	 system	 of	 capital,	
quantification	 becomes	 the	 way	 we	 evaluate	 whether	 our	 desire	 for	more	is	 being	
fulfilled.	If	our	numbers	are	rising,	our	desire	is	met;	if	not,	it	remains	unmet.	Personal	
worth	becomes	synonymous	with	quantity”.	Under	these	conditions,	the	more	metrics	
there	are	on	social	media,	the	more	they	come	to	be	seen	as	legitimate	forms	of	social	
capital,	and	the	more	our	desire	 for	 them	grows.	This	kind	of	 fixation	on	capturing	an	
ever-receding	goal,	whether	it	is	access	to	the	truth	of	a	star	or	achieving	more	likes	and	
followers,	is	definitional	of	the	power	of	glamour.	In	the	end,	these	kinds	of	metrics	may	
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be	affective	measures,	but	they	are	also	highly	effective,	insofar	as	they	work	to	produce	
certain	kinds	of	profit-producing	behavior	in	us	(Beer,	2016).	The	social	discernment	and	
approbation	they	ostensibly	represent	and	the	perpetual	quest	for	more	they	generate	
serve	 a	 disciplinary	 function;	 as	 glamours	 or	 fetishes,	 metrics	 claim	 to	 measure	 the	
intangibles	of	our	social	influence,	but	in	the	end	work	to	tie	us	ever	more	deeply	to	the	
logics	of	the	platform,	incentivizing	us	to	keeping	contributing	to	it.	
	
Popular	feminism	and	the	glamour	of	the	platform	
The	 glamour	 of	 the	 metric,	 of	 course,	 is	 inherent	 in	 the	 logics	 and	 interests	
underpinning	its	deployment	in	the	first	place,	those	of	the	platform.	As	Tarleton	Gillespie	
(2010)	 points	 out,	 the	 term	 ‘platform’	 has	 least	 four	 distinct	 connotations:	
“computational,	something	to	build	upon	and	innovate	from;	political,	a	place	from	which	
to	speak	and	be	heard;	figurative,	in	that	the	opportunity	is	an	abstract	promise	as	much	
as	a	practical	one;	and	architectural	in	that…(it)	is	designed	as	an	open-armed,	egalitarian	
facilitation	 of	 expression”	 (p.	 352).	 These	 multiple	 connotations,	 Gillespie	 argues,	
comprise	 a	 useful	 discursive	 malleability,	 perfectly	 suited	 to	 the	 ambitions	 of	 major	
cultural	 intermediaries	 like	Google,	 Facebook	 and	Youtube,	 allowing	 them	 to	 advance	
their	interests	across	a	range	of	disparate	audiences,	from	users	to	advertisers,	content	
producers	to	regulators.	Gillespie	writes,	“(w)hatever	possible	tension	there	is	between	
being	 a	 ‘platform’	 for	 empowering	 individual	 users	 and	 being	 a	 robust	 marketing	
‘platform’	and	being	a	‘platform’	for	major	studio	content	is	elided	in	the	versatility	of	the	
term	and	the	powerful	appeal	of	the	idea	behind	it”	(p.	358).	The	‘powerful	appeal’	of	
egalitarian	 possibility	 that	 the	 term	 connotes	 helps	 to	 position	 these	 companies	 as	
trustworthy	 mediators	 while	 simultaneously	 affording	 them	 “an	 opportunity	 to	
communicate,	 interact	and	sell”	(p.	351)	with	impunity.	Building	on	Gillespie’s	 insights,	
Nick	Srnicek	 (2016)	argues	 that,	 in	spite	of	 their	claims	 to	neutrality,	 these	companies	
definitely	“embody	a	politics”	(p.	26).	As	essentially	“extractive	apparatus	for	data”	(p.	
27),	 they	 work	 to	 shape	 markets	 and	 how	 those	 markets	 appear	 to	 users,	 primarily	
through	the	use	of	predictive	analytics,	and,	by	laying	ground	rules	for	developers	and	
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users,	 assert	 “control	 and	 governance	 over	 the	 rules	 of	 the	 game”	 (p.	 27).	 Given	 the	
ideological	work	that	the	polysemy	of	the	term	‘platform’	performs	for	these	technology	
companies,	 we	 could	 argue	 that	 the	 word	 itself	 functions	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 ‘glamour’	 -	 a	
promotional,	incentivizing,	industrial	lure.	
While	 promotional/celebratory	 discourses	 suggest	 that	 platforms	 operate	
computationally	 behind	 the	 scenes	 to	 expand	 and	 democratize	 access	 to	 cultural	
production,	if	we	follow	“Mr.	Money-bags”	into	the	hidden	abode	of	production	we	see	
that	companies	 like	Google	and	Facebook	are	striving	for	total	 information	awareness,	
working	to	govern	and	‘optimize’	us	as	users	via	the	extraction	of	data	and	the	application	
of	 predictive	 analytics.	 As	 Ed	 Finn	 (2017)	 argues,	 these	 activities	 shape	 our	 aesthetic	
sensibilities	as	well.	For	example,	Netflix	is	often	cited	as	a	notable	illustration	of	a	cultural	
disruptor,	shifting	the	focus	from	traditional	film	and	broadcast	aesthetic	techniques	in	
search	of	audiences	to	 forms	of	“corporate,	computational	authorship”	 (Finn,	2017,	p.	
103)	that	can	devise	an	audience	for	pretty	well	any	content	out	of	its	cache	of	data.	While	
this	might	result	in	a	plethora	of	new	types	and	qualities	of	cultural	production,	the	reality	
is	that	content	matters	here	only	insofar	as	it	provides	user	metadata	to	generate	more	
and	more	 finely	delineated	audiences	 to	enhance	Netflix’s	own	recommender	system.	
Even	in	the	midst	of	these	new	processes	of	capitalist	accumulation	that	extract	profit-
producing	 data	 from	 our	 cultural	 tastes	 and	 consumption	 practices	 then,	 a	 form	 of	
glamour	 remains.	Our	 emotional	 investment	 in	 the	 legitimacy	of	Netflix’s	metrics	 and	
recommendations	is	actually	an	investment	in	the	authorizing	power	and	glamour	of	the	
platform	itself.	As	the	Shorty	Award	sketch	described	earlier	intimates,	the	fetish	of	the	
star	image	has	simply	been	displaced;	forget	the	taught,	glossy	look	of	Robin	Wright	in	
David	Fincher’s	House	of	Cards,	“(t)he	thing	that	Netflix	ultimately	wants	its	consumers	to	
love	is	not	just	the	content	but	Netflix	itself:	the	application,	the	service,	the	platform”	
(Finn,	 2017,	 p.	 104).	 ‘Instagramming’	 yourself	 thin	 is	 another	 potent	 example	 of	 the	
glamour	of	the	platform;	while	superficially	 it	 is	an	expression	about	the	power	of	the	
other’s’	judgmental	gaze,	it	also	articulates	an	unexamined,	unquestioning	fealty	to	the	
platform	itself.	
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Conclusion		
Arguably,	the	beguiling,	‘glamorous’	nature	of	platformed	cultural	production	is	
rooted	in	the	foundational	logics	of	computationalism	itself.	As	Wendy	Chun	(2013),	David	
Golumbia	(2009),	and	Ed	Finn	(2017),	among	others,	have	pointed	out,	hyper-rationalist	
dreams	about	the	ultimate	programmability	or	computabiity	of	human	life	-	views	that	
see	 the	 human	 brain	 as	 a	 computer	 and	 language	 as	 code	 -	 express	 a	 desire	 for	
transcendence	 and	 are	 based	 in	 a	 belief	 in	 glamour	 or	 ‘magic’	 nonetheless.	 Like	 the	
concept	 of	 ‘logos’,	 Chun	 refers	 to	 computer	 code	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 ‘sourcery’,	 a	 form	 of	
‘rational’	rhetoric	that	promises	to	turn	symbols	into	actions.	Toggling	between	the	visible	
and	 invisible,	 the	 knowable	 and	 the	 mysterious	 ‘yet-to-be-known’,	 computation	 via	
software	embodies	“the	central	function	of	magic	–	the	manipulation	of	symbols	in	ways	
that	impact	the	world”	(Finn	2017,	33).		But,	as	Chun	pointedly	argues,	“we	‘primitive	folk’	
worship	source	code	as	a	magical	entity	–	as	a	source	of	causality	–	when	in	truth	the	
power	 lies	 elsewhere,	most	 importantly,	 in	 social	 and	machinic	 relations”	 (51).	 These	
authors	 all	 link	 cybernetic	 dreams	 about	 the	 performative,	 masterful	 power	 of	
computation	and	its	code-based	forms	of	incantation	and	seduction	to	regimes	of	neo-
liberalism	and	the	hegemony	of	 instrumental	reason.	And,	 like	computer	code,	Joseph	
Weizenbaum	writes,		“instrumental	reason	has	made	of	our	words	a	fetish	surrounded	by	
black	magic.	And	only	the	magicians	have	the	rights	of	the	initiated.	Only	they	can	say	
what	words	mean.	And	they	play	with	words	and	they	deceive	us”	(255).	
Ian	Bogost	 (2015),	Chun	and	Golumbia	all	 remind	us	 that	 assertions	about	 the	
power	of	total	computation,	quantification,	and	the	centrality	of	technological	logics	are	
cultural	or	social	metaphors	or	ideologies	that	have	become	articles	of	faith	for	many	of	
us.	But,	no	matter	how	platform	producers	and	their	technological	innovations	may	lay	
claim	 to	 the	 unassailable	 ‘purity’	 and	 ‘neutrality’	 of	 their	 affordances,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	
remember	 that	 those	 claims	 are	 themselves	 products	 of	 a	 techno-fetishistic	 cultural	
imaginary	marked	by	capitalist	domination,	promotional	homogeneity	and	the	glamour	
of	the	brand.	As	Andrejevic,	Hearn	and	Kennedy	(2015)	argue,	any	critical	analysis	of	data-
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driven,	platform	capitalism	must	necessarily	involve	an	interrogation	of	the	‘post-cultural’	
imaginary	it	evinces,	because,	in	the	end,	the	cultural,	aesthetic	and	political	cannot	be	
surpassed	 by	 technologies	 or	 algorithms,	 no	 matter	 how	 complex,	 unknowable	 or	
compelling	they	might	be.	Indeed,	complex	and	compelling	technologies	are	products	of	
history	 and	 subject	 to	 entrenched	 cultural	 assumptions	 and	 political	 modes	 of	
legitimation	no	matter	how	vociferously	they	might	claim	it	to	be	otherwise.	Given	this,	
widespread	celebratory	discourses	about	 the	 ‘objective’	work	of	 computation	and	 the	
programmability	of	culture	should	be	all	the	motivation	we	need	to	attend	more	carefully	
to	 that	 which	 is	 being	 disavowed	 –	 the	 work	 of	 power	 as	 expressed	 in	 and	 through	
aesthetics,	like	glamour.		
The	 dominance	 of	 computationalist,	 techno-solutionist	 ideologies	 have	
implications	 for	 politics	 and	 social	 movements	 of	 course,	 including	 feminism.	 	 As	
Golumbia	(2009)	argues,	and	as	we	have	shown	above,	just	because	computation	can	be	
individually	empowering	does	not	then	mean	that,	“this	sheer	expansion	of	power	will	
somehow	liberate	us	from	deep	cultural-political	problems”	(152).	Over	the	last	several	
years,	 privately	 owned	 social	media	 platforms	 have	 provoked	major	 crises	 of	 trust	 in	
democractic	governance,	exacerbated	class	divisions,	and	helped	to	intensify	resistance	
to	racial	and	gender	justice;	it	is	now	painfully	clear	that	“what	has	been	flattened	via	IT	
is	 not	 at	 all	 individual	 access	 to	 culture,	 economics,	 or	political	 power,	 but	 rather	 the	
“playing	field”	for	capitalist	actors”	(147).	As	a	form	of	beguilement	and	obfuscation,	the	
aesthetic	 force	of	glamour	expressed	 in	 images,	metrics,	and	platforms	plays	a	central	
role	in	normalizing	these	conditions.		
Terry	Eagleton	(1995)	reminds	us	that	“what	matters	in	aesthetics	is	not	art	but	
this	whole	 project	 of	 reconstructing	 the	 human	 subject	 from	 the	 inside,	 informing	 its	
subtlest	affections	and	bodily	responses…Once	new	ethical	habits	have	been	 installed,	
the	 sheer	quick	 feel	 or	 impression…will	 be	 enough	 for	 sure	 judgment,	 short-circuiting	
discursive	labour	and	thus	mystifying	the	laws	which	regulate	it”	(p.	330).	It	is	difficult	to	
imagine	a	more	apt	description	of	the	ways	in	which	we,	as	users	and	content	producers,	
tend	 to	 engage	 in	 the	 world	 of	 social	 media	 these	 days;	 “the	 sheer	 quick	 feel	 or	
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impression”	does	indeed	inform	and	secure	judgment	and	action	online,	militating	against	
more	fulsome	types	of	debates	and	engagements.	In	this	paper,	we	have	tried	to	identify	
the	ways	in	which	the	affective	force	of	glamour	performs	the	kind	of	subjectivising	work	
described	 by	 Eagleton	 through	 the	 example	 of	 popular	 feminism.	 The	 multiple	
expressions	 of	 popular	 feminism,	 circulating	 rapidly	 across	 social	 and	 digital	 media,	
authorize	a	“sure	judgment”,	not	about	what	feminism	is	or	should	be,	but	simply	how	it	
should	be	performed	or	visualized.	Indeed,	the	glamour	of	popular	feminism	comprises	
the	idea	that	one	can	“insta-gram”	oneself	a	feminist,	wispy	and	capacious	at	the	same	
time,	 constituted	 and	 validated	 by	 the	metrics	 and	 circulatory	 logics	 of	 technological	
platforms.			
Glamour	suffuses	platformed	cultural	production,	albeit	in	unconventional	ways.	
At	the	level	of	the	image,	the	metric,	and	the	platform,	glamour	beguiles;	as	it	generates	
affective	 responses	 in	users,	 summoning	 them	with	a	 ‘wispy’	promise	of	 fulfillment	or	
social	recognition,	it	modifies	and	conditions	what	counts	as	legible	or	‘authentic’	forms	
of	 selfhood.	 All	 of	 this	 is	 done	 in	 order	 to	 enhance	 the	 affordances,	 data	 extraction	
practices,	and	profit	of	the	major	platforms.	Feminized,	magical,	connoting	the	occult	and	
the	 arcane,	 highly	 stylized	 and	 symbolic,	 alluring,	 fetishistic,	 deeply	 conditioned	 by	
technology,	 linked	 to	 the	 arts	 of	 promotion	 but	 characterized	 also	 by	 profound	
indifference	and	ambivalence,	in	this	paper	we	have	argued	that	the	aesthetic	of	glamour	
provides	 both	 a	 compelling	 heuristic	 and	 an	 apt	 descriptor	 for	 platformed	 cultural	
production	today.	
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